lady lady was the best part of her job as a political wife. second, she was not the wife of an ambassador for statesmen. she was just a young woman who have come to the united states and come out first to see the second lady and came here to study. she did not limit her contacts. she treated everyone she met as though they were the most important person in the world. was she mad since your sincerity and responded to it. third, she was happiest in her role when she could take action. the engagement with the nixons were going to were not as important at that moment is getting this visitor from india a seat at the presidential dinner. this is really a small act, but it left a lasting impression on the indian woman involved and on

the women at the table that she was eventually ceded back. how we know about this is through a letter with some and she ended up sitting wet and wrote later about. on occasion she was proud of the work she found many other tasks frustrating and mindnumbing. by the end of the first term, she expressed her jealousy of her friends reentry into the workforce. she wrote that i would like to do part-time work rather than all the useless gabbing about that i am expected to do. the thrill of meeting famous men and women in the grammar of white tie dinners at the white house were off. leaving idle chatter with women that she did not always lie. she was someone who worked hard her entire life and should have done so.

the situation could at times be intolerable. it was not the physical challenges await her down. she resented not being the useful in doing something meaningful. perhaps that is why foreign travel appeals to her. during her trips overseas, she felt that she was playing an important role. she was representing american interests abroad. the introduction came during her first year as second lady. president eisenhower center on a tour beginning in asia and continued to parts of the subcontinent. during the fall of 1953. president eisenhower told the vice president should take chat with him. she realize that this trip is realize that this trip was when the work and it was going to be interesting. >> you can watch this and other programs online booktv.org. booktv now, william cooper presents a lead up to the civil

war to april 1861. the author looks at the north in the south and the attempt at compromise to avoid war that failed upon the attack at fort sumter in april of 1861. this is just under one hour. >> thank you very much. i am very pleased to be here at the atlanta history center. i have been coming to atlanta for decades, and i still have a very strong connection to the city. my wife went to college here. my brothers went to ask you here. my oldest son also went to law school here. my younger son with his family, he lives here. my wife has an aunt and cousin who also appear. there are still very strong connections.

tonight, i'm going to discuss abraham lincoln's role of 1860 to 1861. more specifically, i'm going to talk about abraham lincoln and how he rejected any meaningful compromise. in november 1860 after his election, the country was gripped because many southerners felt in the republican party, the republican party was in northern party and proudly so. they did not have a significant southern connection. lincoln was elected without a single electoral vote without any of the southern states. the first time in the nations history, a party without any

notable southern components would be taking over the executive branch of the national government. but there was more. the republican party was probably a northern party. during its existence in the mid-1850s, the rhetoric had assaulted the south and racial slavery, their determination -- the republicans determination, were to win a national election without any southern support and republicans repeatedly condemned this undemocratically, even on american way. with this party on the threshold of the presidency, seven radicals, those people who preached the gospel of the union, they took to the public platform and newspaper columns

to proclaim that the crisis of the south was at hand. the south had act immediately to protect itself from the hatred of evil republicans. this was not the first time that such a crisis that gripped the country. they were disputing and there have been several sharp disputes. each of these major ones have been settled by a compromise. i will point to the four critical ones. the first is the convention of 1787 in philadelphia, 1820 that had to do with missouri as a slave state and louisiana in the state of the rocky mountains, it

was settled by the missouri compromise. in 1832 and 1833, the controversy between the state of south carolina and the federal government was also done by compromise. finally, the late 1840s, the battle over the future of slavery in the territory won from mexico, known as the mexican succession following the mexican war was followed by the compromise of 1850. if you look at these four examples, settlement took place in 1861. the chief issue between the republicans in the south involved slaves. not slavery in the 15 states where it existed. almost all americans in 1860, republicans included, believed that the constitution protected

slavery in the states where it existed. whether the critical question was slavery and the national territories and the territories owned by the nation that had not yet become states and regrettably, these territories were comprised of what we think is the great plains. west of the rocky mountains to california. it didn't include california because california was already a state. the question was critical because it had to do with the future of slavery and the future of southern power in the nation. now, they have demanded what they consider their constitutional right as american citizens to take their property, including slave property, into territories owned by the entire

nation. in 1857, there was an infamous decision and the united states supreme court confirmed the constitutional review. republicans, in contrast, never. the republicans would allow no more slaves in any territory. abraham lincoln was elected in november of 1860. a month later, the united states congress came into session. members of congress put forth various compromise proposals. a critical portion of all dealt with the divisions of territories. most often there was a proposal tuesday extended west beyond the louisiana purchase all the way to the border of california. now, after this preface, i'm

going to get to my main point. when lincoln rejected all compromise with regard to territories. but there must be something more. i'm going to talk about three different men tonight. one of them, abraham lincoln, you know what he was and what he did. one of two americans, so well-known. the great kentucky statesman, henry clay, and william henry seward of new york state and prior to lincoln's nomination for the presidency was by far the most notable and well-known republican in the country. here i am. i am ready to start.

[applause] >> henry clay had been dead for eight years by 1860. he was a major figure in american politics. he was known as a great compromise or when the great pacific theater. on three occasions in 1820 in 1832 in 1833, he had a major role in shaping compromise. still, that doesn't bring him down to 1862 us. he comes down to us because abraham lincoln looked to clay as his political mentor. he was his political hero and he called him the ideal of the statesman. lincoln's best-known remark on clay, came in a eulogy he

delivered in the week after clay's death. he praised the statesman's leading and most conspicuous part of sexual compromise. at the same time, he underscored that as a politician and statesman, no one was as careful as clay consider all grounds. he worked with political opponents as well as political allies. he engaged his whole energy on behalf of the union. as late as february 1861, in the middle of the crisis of the union, lincoln professed that during my whole political life i have revered clay as a teacher and leader. he also noted clay's opposition

to slavery. several times we can make clear to point to his detestation of slavery. lincoln didn't invent anti-slavery. he downplayed his ability to moderate that stance. he did detest the institution. he even did so unsuccessfully to get his state to adopt gradual emancipation. he also said that he would never force lavery word had not previously existed.

yet in 1850, clay declared that if the citizens they are placed slavery in their constitutions, he would honor their choice, and he did back the compromise of 1850, which gave the possibility of slavery in the new mexico and utah territories. the clay, no other moral issue match the importance for maintenance of the union. lincoln also spoke about compromise. publicly stood for the compromise in 1850. he announced that i, too, go for saving the union. much as i hate slavery, he said, i would consent to an extension

rather than see the union dissolved. and i would consent to any other evil to avoid a greater one. in the 1850s, these declarations disappeared from lincoln's speeches. he did indicate that he still acquiesced in the compromise of 1860. lincoln received a nomination in large part because he was perceived as more conservative. thus more electable than the better-known steward. a closer look would have cast doubt on this assumption. in his widely distributed house divided speech of 1858, he had announced that the country cannot endure publicly have slavery and hackery. in substance, this house divided

idea and conflict idea associated said there was a conflict between north and south end dream of slavery. one great difference does exist, however, the imminent spokesman of politics for decades, as far back as 1850, he had condemned in the territorial compromise, including the compromise of 1850. he called for a higher law than the constitution. republicans floundering for victory passed over him. he had been in the public eye too long. when the crisis erupted after lincoln's election, not crisis led to a discussion and how to respond to it, lincoln

unequivocally opposed compromise even as the unit can afar. he absolutely did not adopt that stance. why he broke sharply from the heritage -- there is no simple answer. the historical record does ferment, i think, the reasonable explanation. i think the evidence leads to promoters, vigorous partisanship, and his visceral anti-slavery commitment. i like to think of each of these three intern. first, about the south. a lack of understanding about the south, is missing the seriousness of secession and looking on as a conspiracy touted by a small band of radicals to be put down by

sensible union men like himself. as he saw it, the drive for secession certainly has nothing to do with anything he or his party have said or done. that conclusion left to observations. the first was the house divided declaration when he bluntly told southerners that the union had no place for them in the chief social institution. moreover, irrepressible conflicts faced by republican hard-liners, and likewise, lincoln had been tone deaf. he must've been. he told a kentucky and neither he nor any other republican had

justly made himself obnoxious to the south by anything he has said or done. lincoln never stop thinking about how he would have reacted to a responsible southern leader, publicly claiming the state had no future in the union. yes, he did react forcibly to what he claimed was a plot by southerners to nationalize slavery. even on the stump, suggested that that's important to me to make illinois a slave state. no politician ever had taken such a course. it also appears indisputable that he assumed such a stance because he knew so little about the south. at 19 and 22, he had taken brief

trips to new orleans. as you know, he was born in kentucky and his wife came from a slaveowning family in that state, as did his best friend. but that part of the south was all that he knew. you never travel in the south beyond kentucky, aside from a few kentuckians, he did not know any southerners are certainly not in the southern politicians. the united states house of representatives, where he met southerners, in fact became friendly with a few. that was almost a decade and a half before the crisis following his election in 1860, in the end he had kept up with none of those men. fundamentally he had no one that

he could educate about the south and southern politics. it basically match the anti-slavery depictions. in 1860 and 1861, agitating secession. lincoln appears to have had no understanding of the widespread ownership of slavery and white or how deeply slavery had become embedded in southern society. instead of comprehending the overwhelming majority of southern whites were committed to their slave society, it seems that lincoln thought of them as conservative union or is, in other words, they were very much like abraham lincoln, except perhaps without his moral outrage toward slavery.

perhaps the mass of southern whites would not activate against slavery, but lincoln could not imagine that either pro-slave were acting against the union. a south where non-slaveowners were, he and the republicans were foreign and unknown. his hometown came to see him after the election and he was honestly alarmed by the republican triumph. lincoln's reply spoke volumes. there are no such men. with no firsthand knowledge and having no real friends or even serious acquaintances among southern politicians, lincoln

did not acknowledge tension between zealous advocates for succession and others who were fundamentally conservative and had no relish for the union. meanwhile, jefferson davis had become the confederate vice president and stevens even opposed sessions in georgia. lincoln put them altogether. [inaudible] lincolns allegiance powerfully influenced his compromise. his partisanship has to play a

part. by november of 1860, he had spent a brief time about the security of the leadership and anxious about party unity. during the crisis, many republicans and non-republicans alike urged him make a public statement addressing the issues and reassuring southerners of their rights and his determination to be president. time and time again he refused. respondent to this request, he embraced a mantra that says i'm open to the inspection of of this. the petition, as he phrased it, but only half as clinical

position. his inflexibility, he seemed not to fathom that the most vigorous rhetoric could terrify the south. additionally, never did lincoln acknowledge that everyone of those statements have been made as a republican partisan, not as the next president. none of those declarations have been made when the country faced monumental crisis. obviously, lincoln never stepped forward publicly in an effort conciliate southerners. he had, given his unmatched gift for particular political moment, one might imagine such an address could have admitted his recognition, but he was not one of them or a southerner.

quickly have countered that we are all still americans. during his presidency, they would never turn upon the south. not once did lincoln ever said publicly that he would be president of all americans. and claimed he cannot deviate from it and he acted like a partisans partisan, not the leader of a country. the critical question focuses on the why, underlined the legitimate. the evidence suggests that the hardliners selected his party and he constantly expressed concern about fracturing his party.

lincoln warned that the republican party would disintegrate. the party clearly outnumbered the left. a suggested approach to his concentrated [inaudible] or it it had been passed over as being too radical. but in this crisis, he became a man who aimed at compromise. early on, perceive the union to be in mortal danger. above all, he wanted the dissolution, if possible. if it hadn't been for the 1850s and knowing many southern politicians, he had a much better grasp than lincoln of the political force of secession and the political reality facing moderate southerners like davis

and stevens. he believed they had done their work for the republican party and to him, it was a chiefly political matter. united states is never going to add any more territory without republican conference. they needed to put in place as one obstacle. he judged the proclivities as democratic. but in 1860, the democratic party divided, that division culminated in the republican triumph.

it cost the republicans trouble unless the party could expand. to bring these people and the republican party was not only possible, but it was essential. without question, a number of them were quite willing to become republican and come into a party that emphasize the union rather than antagonism. no evidence just that lincoln conceived in the republican future beyond the border of the 1860 party. he did later on, but not in 1860. ..

the. >> before hostilities yes

lincoln used it from a partisan perspective but there was another reason. underlying his rejection of serious compromise. there is a deeper more visceral hatred of slavery van seward. he did did -- he did not put it was the quality of freedom but good geographic expansion of the restates along with debt economic power that this would naturally overpower slavery. he would not let the political lacklustre rates become a casualty of what he foresaw as america is

inevitable progress. such accomplishes purpose in 1860 elected a republican seward was likely. but not lincoln. issue is not about politics alone. is spoke of the nation primarily as a symbol. in his mind and must be about freedom, never slavery. with the cooper union speech that helped to. him to the top of the list of republican candidates. >> to make opposition and the federal government to act of legacy was the during

an aftermath of the revolution. focusing on industry group of men who signed the constitution. including the southerners his version of history it had been shattered aside. it was the duty of the republicans. as a legal brief was effective but emphasize eight of what he called fax.

after a three decades to go side-by-side. with powerful support with notable founding fathers. that slavery was quiet and organize is from george washington to james monroe. of course, that included john adams and jefferson and madison. of slavery the founding fathers of the complicated legacy and we did never wanted to believe. the crisis he did write private letters to a few southerners and then he was

added to talk about slavery and right and wrong a. this is not new language four lincoln. he told a former law partner the slavery question cannot be compromised. that was a logical statement from a man that lincoln compared slavery in freedom of two beasts held apart. those antagonist break the bonds then the question will be settled. steven douglas the great democrat from illinois what he saw as the view of slavery he said douglas

don't care but god cares and humanity cares proprietary. to his past lincoln describes evil over all national deals and dangers have come. it must be stopped. to accept a compromise that there would even permit the theory of expansion expansion -- lincoln. he never advocated any moves timing begin he declared the federal government does us no such power. even supported the one measure aimed at compromise coming at of congress with the original 14 commencement the would have made the prohibition of slavery as a

state possible. and hid did pass congress in would have been put on the constitution. >> host: day expressed his support that would make the abolition almost impossible. he simply could not count but with that expansion itself lincoln found a way past the barrier. slavery he announced must remain within the borders in that fashion. some of the absolute partisanship and his heart abraham lincoln was done yielding. of meaningful

copper-- compromise. and rejected the legacy. and with that it failed. a compromise failed and so did the succession plans. thank you very much. [applause] >> please come to the microphone. >> who was talking to lincoln about compromise other than seward? >> a lot of other republicans.

with the efforts of the congress i don't want to bore you but congressional republicans opposed-- propose a compromise and say please join our side. lincoln said no. in the south of the border states and he said no. also northern democrats. republicrepublic an party itself if there was the upper down vote to undoubtedly and a compromise forces most part in the middle as republicans from congress they were waiting for a signal and lincoln made it clear where he stood

seward realize he would have to follow nine i the bid is fair to say without his efforts in every be more vance seven states with montgomery seven -- 1961. >> what were the terms of a proposal? >> one key issue is the territory to divide it to. the most, proposal was to draw a geographical line west. once you get past kansas to the rocky mountains and beyond freedom on one side

and the possibility on the other. one proposal to the next was the key to divide negative great territory out there that is always the key. return of fugitive slaves the internet slave trade and the key was always the territories. that was the future both the south and north. >> [inaudible] >> i do not make the civil war was inevitable. that is what my book is about.

lincoln did not make it have been himself. but the failure of compromise is not made war house to come. president lincoln did not come for another six weeks but charleston harbor had nothing to do with it but the failure of compromises sure there was a number of states out of the union. will question of the board itself is another question. but that is another question >> those to focus on the plurality it did not vote for and been january 2 when it came tied to elect the

delegates but in that timeframe the tide turned and i am wondering if the compromise proposal if with the election and it was over? >> let me give you an example from georgia up. not atlanta per se but there was a special committee to come up with a solution to the problem. one of the members lived in washington and was an avid is secessionist i'd like his statements. with a compromise proposals came before the him he said

he but except such a proposal even though he did not like it because he knew georgia would excepting for crow but to said i will stand for it. if not the succession convention that was a narrow vote. and the election is one of the problems that people have with the leadership for reasons that difficult to understand made it difficult to campaign for their side. but there was a narrow margin of the first broke. not in this state. but if you had in a type of

compromise moving to the congress you'd have of reprise of the nullification of process. because once used to emulate georgette and louisiana which is very divided other states had to move first for them to come out. i think going through congress would have made a big difference. >> what is the steps necessary? >> as far as seven hours worked concerned they did in a gray could nationalize slavery. estate would have to decide what is not a federal decision. illinois house to make that decision. the supreme court to said they could take their property to any state or

territory. with the supreme court to might have done is a senator could take the property traveling from illinois and many have laws against that. the most have laws that would free any state. some scholars argue that is a far cry from nationalizing slavery. few if any would have never voted to put that into place. >> this is a good example of failure to compromise does something great. the inability to compromise

people see as a problem related to the problem to save the country's big matt my answer is always i have enough trouble explaining the past. [laughter] the future is beyond me. of the present is beyond me much less the future. [laughter] >> had with sister lived long enough speed nine. >> that is a better question for me. that is about the past even know it is counterfactual.

who knows? yet to there were some republican in hard-liners who would say we cannot take that kind of stand a and they would have compromised anything to keep the union together but it. >> host: t is not coming apart before his eyes. he became president of the truncated union. nobody knew. i cannot say they could have persuaded link and budget there would have been more forces for compromise than they were worth. >> the book stops when the shooting starts.

>> what do you think would have happened had they chose to take the compromise of letting them know in today's they would run out of supplies? >> that was not a compromise that major anderson proposed. first early march he and four rushing 10 he was running at a supplies and could only last six weeks. he never said that before. he also said that what the confederates had built was so strong it would take a massive force to relieve him successfully from the army and navy to provide.

he really said i cannot maintain myself but anderson valley expected to withdraw. when the decides he will send the expedition to provide supplies although he did not send troops when beauregard send the delegation out to say you have to surrender come at that point* and a sense said i have got to leave in two days. if you come mai will fight back. he took them information to

montgomery. the orders came back and is then will specify when he will leave then you do not take him out. anderson said i will leave that noon april 15th unless i receive different orders from my government or reinforce and then the confederates new that relief mission was on its way so that answer would not do because he did not print -- promised he would leave so he was told the fighting would commence promptly. so he never made the proposal in those terms. >> did abraham lincoln and no would have been for

sumpter? lower trick them into attacking first? >> he had every reason to expect the southerners would attack the fourth. he was told that by a -- to directly by seward and others. the word is coercion. any part of the confederate states would result in a war and secession. lincoln told the man who had devised the relief plan that it worked out fine for them. he also told his friend u.s.

thinking of sumpter all along if things work out the best is hard for me to believe lincoln did not expect them to shoot but hoped that they wouldn't hand he probably did but expected is too much. he tell the governor would you was doing. but not jefferson davis. he sent a message and said i am sending and food and medical supplies. no guns will be fired unless my resupply force for since you. there is no trick jury. they may have leave to the troops because it is too complicated write-down with

a diplomatic mission that was not lincoln doing. >> many people think the worst president was president buchanan because he did not take sufficient or any action to offset the civil war. >> buchanan did some things. for example,, when major avis and -- in disenchants for the force from the loathsome of a violent too well to -- -- to read it

they could take militarily. they were upset with the powerful democrats in congress were upset because he promised he would take no action. based on that move he would forests him to withdraw. but he would not do that. his decision to maintain fort sumter he held onto the remainder of his presidency. and then buchanan said if he needed help he had it ready to come. to be faced with what he was faced with, buchanan would have ordered withdrawals. but he did more than he

received credit. he denied doing as much as he could have been he also had a terrible problem. he could not get anything how the congress. republicans oppose everything. [laughter] fists. [inaudible] >> thank you very much. [applause] >> we will carry on with counterfactual history. we will have the book signing out there as well. thank you. >> the book starts out with

a combat mission 2003. north of a town in iraq. are you marines? note? marine unit got cut off and the biggest sandstrom i have ever seen in my life rolled into seven arabia and iraq and cover the continent somebody had to get down underneath to save the marines. that is of the book opens. i talk about the history of what i did. airforce? cadets? good. been there done that. the wild weasel is a very unique and desperate person whose job in my is to get

shot at by surface-to-air missiles. when you survive you go back around to remove the threat to so they don't bother anybody else. i will not tell you what the first vice dead with mixed company and youngsters but it this bus three job so i talk about the history of how that came to pass. it is not a textbook per cry like to learn without knowing that i am writing -- learning. so you get history and you start to with what happened when i was commissioned as a lieutenant in the process it takes to become a pilot, fighter pilot after that. to talk wrote the first goal for there are funny things

in there. is hard not to spend 20 years without doing funny things but my first day was at the air base in turkey and there is amusing stories in there. i did and exchange toured the egyptian airforce to go to school to learn how to speak arabic to learn about them and how they think and operate. there's a chapter called fly like an egyptian. some amusing anecdotes that year i spent and some not so on using it opens with the morning i was doing a test flight as